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Abstract	 Safety cases have long been required by many safety standards and 
guidelines. Particularly in the UK, new systems in key sectors such as defence, 
nuclear and rail need a safety case before they can be certified and approved. 
Proponents of safety cases have justified this on the basis of some explicit theory 
(e.g. that of Toulmin) and by using a variety of plausible, common-sense arguments. 
There has, unsurprisingly, been a large amount of research on safety cases, on how 
to structure them, how to review them, and (increasingly) how to formalise them 
mathematically or generate them automatically. However, there has been very little 
research that evaluates safety case methods and practices as a whole. Do they 
“work”, in terms of safety or other benefits? If so, when, how and why do they 
work? In particular, there has been almost no research on “the science of the safety 
case” — no systematic marshalling of all the claims used to promote safety case 
methods, and importantly no research programme to test each one. In this paper, 
we identify the key claims made by safety case proponents. We emphasise claims 
about mechanism — those about how and why safety cases provide benefits. From 
there, we spell out how to identify the most important research questions raised by 
those claims, and outline a community-wide research approach that could help 
answer those questions. To do this will require that we first understand how people 
currently develop safety cases and what their concerns, needs, constraints and 
problems are. There is little point in testing hypotheses and solutions that do not 
target real problems. 
1 Introduction 
The adoption of safety cases is becoming widespread in many domains (Sujan 
2016). There is little empirical evidence, however, as to what benefits safety cases 
actually deliver. On the one hand, proponents of safety case have made many claims 
about their benefits, such as those reported by (Rinehart 2017). On the other hand, 
several authors have made plausible objections to their use. 
The objections to the use of safety cases take a number of forms. There are many 
anecdotal accounts of people questioning whether safety case activities are worth 
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the substantial cost involved. Some authors, e.g. (Leveson 2011), have gone further 
and suggested that safety cases may have negative effects even if cost is 
disregarded. Whilst some of these criticisms are easy to reject as being based upon 
false premises (such as that safety cases are only ever produced at the end of the 
development process), some of the criticisms are credible and deserve consideration 
(such as the risk of confirmation bias). 
All safety activities could be subject to the same question — are they effective? 
And (if so) are they worth the cost? This is not a question that has been answered 
for most safety activities — no surprise, as it is very hard to measure (Rae 2020). 
Given that, the key question thus becomes not “do safety cases work?”, but rather 
“is a safety case regime better than alternative approaches, and (if so) where, when, 
and how, exactly?”. 
To answer those questions, we will need to understand how people currently 
develop safety cases and what their concerns, needs, constraints and problems are. 
There is little point in testing hypotheses and solutions that do not target real 
problems.  
This is all significant because without trustworthy and usable evidence of 
appropriateness, efficacy and cost-effectiveness, that supports actual needs, the 
vibrant safety case community risks a crisis of legitimacy. This is particularly the 
case with the significant uncertainties about the gap between the continuously 
emerging safety case methods and tools and actual safety case practices. Such 
practices rarely fit the abstract and simplified characterisation of industry problems 
and contexts as reported in research papers. 
We consider three aspects: 
1. Establishing real-world safety assurance needs: What are the actual needs 
that safety cases have the potential to meet? How do we establish these needs 
and understand the context within which they occur? 
2. Creating process theories that capture how safety case practice leads to 
meeting (or not meeting) needs: How, under what circumstances, and to what 
extent do safety case methods meet these needs? What are the intermediate 
steps in that process? What does it look like when that process is going well; 
what about when it is going badly? 
3. Evaluating efficacy and efficiency results: Which research methods and 
settings are appropriate and feasible to generate the efficacy and efficiency 
evidence? How can we appraise such evidence against the safety assurance 
needs? 
In this paper, we will review existing work on addressing these questions for 
safety cases, and describe how we could make progress towards better answers. 
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2 A Very Brief History of Safety Case Research 
In this section, we take a historic research-oriented view of safety case concepts and 
methods. Readers interested in the industrial roots of safety cases, notable accidents 
that led to wide usage of safety cases in certain industries and key standards that 
require or recommend their use are advised instead to consult the reviews by 
Haddon-Cave (Haddon-Cave 2009) and Sujan et. al. (Sujan 2016). Bloomfield and 
Bishop (Bloomfield 2010) also offer a practice-oriented review of safety cases, with 
a focus on software-based systems. 
Although the explicit practice of developing safety cases has its roots in the 
nuclear industry in the 1950s (Arnold 2016), the conceptual basis was established 
in the 1990s, most notably through the seminal work of Kelly and McDermid at 
York (Wilson 1995, Kelly 1999) and Bishop and Bloomfield at Adelard (Bishop 
2000). The research largely built on Toulmin’s work on informal logic (Toulmin 
1958) and laid the foundation for the notion of structured argumentation as an 
explicit and core part of safety cases. Further, influenced by the move towards more 
graphical models in software engineering (Rumbaugh 1999), combined with goal-
based approaches to requirements definition (Dardenne 1993), two graphical 
notations for the representation of safety arguments were developed namely the 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) (ACWG 2018) and Claim Argument Evidence 
(CAE) (Bloomfield 1998). Realising the importance of the systematic construction 
of safety cases, detailed methods were created for the development, reuse and 
maintenance of safety arguments and for integrating the production of the safety 
case with the design and operation of the system (Kelly 1999, Bishop 2000). 
In short, the early research by York and Adelard emphasised the need for (1) an 
explicit, detailed and well-formed safety argument and (2) the integration of the 
safety case into the design and evolution of the system. This was clearly stated by 
Bishop and Bloomfield: “the safety case life-cycle should be an integral part of the 
overall system development, and this should continue throughout the lifetime of the 
system” (Bishop 2000). 
Two notable extensions of the early research are worth highlighting. The first is 
safety argument patterns, building on the notion of design patterns in software 
engineering (Gamma 1995) and more fundamentally the pattern language that was 
defined by the architect and design theorist Christopher Alexander (Alexander 
1977). Safety argument patterns provided means for documenting and reusing 
“successful” argument structures that relate to recurring safety assurance needs, 
requirements or strategies, e.g. arguments structured based on the concept that the 
risks should be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) or based on separating 
the product- and process-oriented assurance aspects of safety engineering (Kelly 
1999). Unfortunately, very little reuse of patterns has been reported, particularly 
between organisations, mainly because the number of people who publish their 
experiences is very low.  
Modularity in safety cases is the second major extension. Building on concepts 
and representations in software architectures, modular safety cases were created as 
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way to address inevitable changes and the scale and complexity in the system, 
environment and the safety case itself (Kelly 2001). Similar to argument patterns, 
the wider adoption of modular safety cases remains an open question. 
Research in the last two decades has largely focused on implementing the 
aforementioned concepts. Key research themes include: 
– Notations: extensions of existing notations such as Assurance Claims Points 
(ACPs) for GSN (Hawkins 2011) or for representing dialectic arguments (Yuan 
2013) 
– Processes: detailed processes for integrating safety cases into the overall safety, 
systems and software engineering processes (Denney 2015) 
– Model-based arguments: providing a metamodel foundation and utilising 
model-based mechanisms such as model transformation, traceability and 
validation (Hawkins 2015, Denney 2014, Wei 2019) 
– Automation: software tooling for representing and maintaining the argument 
and associated evidence (Denney 2012) 
– Formalism: representing arguments in formal logic in order to “prove” certain 
assurance properties or support automated reasoning (Rushby 2010, Habli 
2009) 
– System- or domain-specific arguments: largely documented in patterns. e.g. for 
embedded automotive systems (Birch 2013), COTS (Ye 2005) or machine 
learning (Picardi 2019) 
– Assurance cases: as a generalisation of safety cases in order to address other 
critical properties such as security (Rushby 2015) 
– Review: detailed processes for evaluating different properties of safety cases 
(Chowdhury 2020), including known fallacies (Greenwell 2006) 
– Confidence: assessment of different sources of uncertainty in safety cases, with 
a particular emphasis on quantification of confidence (Guiochet 2014, Ayoub 
2012), most notably through Bayesian Networks (Littlewood 2007, Denney 
2011) 
Despite the scale of the above research areas, they have not advanced a new 
theoretical understanding of the discipline. For example, issues around automation 
and formalism were discussed in detail by Wilson and McDermid in 1995 (Wilson 
1995). Around the same period, quantification of confidence was investigated 
through the Safety and Risk Evaluation using Bayesian Nets (SERENE) project 
(Bouissou 1999). 
Finally, challenges and weaknesses in safety case concepts, methods and 
practices have been highlighted in published research. This is of course no bad thing 
— it is a necessary property of a healthy research community. The reported 
weaknesses relate to the complexity of the notion itself (e.g. safety case vs safety 
case report (Habli 2007)), the different interpretations of safety cases (Graydon 
2017), practicalities particularly in regulatory contexts (e.g. integration into goal-
based standards (Penny 2001)), the lack of sufficient skills and training (e.g. 
imbalance in skills between developers and assessors (Kelly 2008)), the need to 
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address cognitive biases (Leveson 2011), and the importance of stronger review and 
inspection mechanisms (e.g. similar to other prescriptive and standards measures in 
civil engineering (Wassyng 2010)). The lack of empirical evaluation has been 
highlighted by Sujan el. al. in a study funded by the Health Foundation (Sujan 2016) 
and more recently by (Graydon 2020) and (Reinhart 2017). 
3 The Value of Safety Cases 
A review of the literature reveals that there has been little serious research into 
whether safety cases are of net value for safety. By this we mean research that seeks 
to demonstrate that the money, effort etc. that is expended on developing a safety 
case — what (Woods 2015) calls “safety energy” — is better put to use on them 
than on other safety activities. 
3.1 The general research evaluation landscape 
The main work related to this was undertaken by (Reinhart 2017) that investigated 
“assurance case practices” with a focus on effectiveness. This work provides a 
starting point for understanding the value of safety cases. However, the results are 
based exclusively on literature review and self-reporting from interviews. The 
literature reviewed includes very little systematic empirical work. 
Other work reports upon the success of big projects that have used safety cases 
(Eisner 2000). However these are little more than detailed anecdotes. In addition, it 
is very difficult to compare such examples as there is such variation in the nature of 
the systems considered and the ways in which the results are reported.  
Overall, the evidence base for the value of safety cases is poor. In addition, rival 
theories say that there are better ways to spend safety energy than through 
developing safety cases, e.g. by developing and following highly prescriptive and 
domain-specific compliance standards (Wassyng 2010). 
A lack of rigorous empirical evidence for the effectiveness of safety cases 
coupled with the existence of credible rival approaches is sufficient grounds upon 
which to question the actual value of safety cases. However, it does not necessarily 
imply that safety cases are not an effective approach. It is important to acknowledge 
the difficulty in undertaking this kind of evaluation. This is true not just for safety 
cases, but for any safety approach. There are a number of impediments that exist 
here, including but not limited to: lack of public domain safety case examples, 
inability to share data, lack of control studies, lack of funding for empirical research 
in this area and labour (and time) -intensive nature of this research. There are also 
lots of good non-systematic-empirical reasons to think that safety cases might be 
good idea. For a recent illustration of this in another domain, see (Greenhalgh 2020) 
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on the need for thoughtful, interpretive critical reflection and narrative review when 
assessing the efficacy of face coverings in controlling the spread of COVID-19. 
3.2 Specific claims about the value of safety cases 
The literature discussed in the previous section makes some specific claims about 
the value of safety case approaches. (Reinhart 2017) extracts seven claims about 
them (albeit using the more generic term assurance case): 
1. Assurance cases are successful where suitable. 
2. Assurance cases are more comprehensive than conventional methods alone. 
3. Assurance cases improve the allocation of responsibility over prior norms. 
4. Assurance cases organize information more effectively than conventional 
methods. 
5. Assurance cases address modern certification challenges. 
6. Assurance cases offer an efficient certification path compared to other 
approaches. 
7. Assurance cases provide a practical, robust way to establish due diligence. 
Reinhart et al’s work is a valuable step towards our goals.  However, these 
claims are too high level and coarse-grained to be easily studied. (Graydon 2020), 
building on the review by Rinehart et al., derives more testable hypotheses. These 
are interesting, but do not form a coherent whole — Graydon proposes a large 
number of small variance claims that do not obviously fit together. 
One thing that is revealed from considering the various claims made regarding 
safety cases is the sheer range of claims on what safety cases can do (Graydon 
2017). This raises important questions such as: 
– How compatible are the claims with each other? 
– Do different “schools of thought” (Graydon 2017) suggest incompatible or 
awkwardly-compatible things? 
– Can safety cases really do all those things? Can they be done at the same time? 
4 Evaluating Safety Case Efficacy 
4.1 We need process, as well as variance, theories 
In the previous section we discussed some of the existing claims made regarding 
safety cases. These claims invariably seek to characterise the “what”, in terms of 
what safety cases achieve. They thus constitute a variance theory, in that they 
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describe how one property (e.g. awareness of risk) varies with another (e.g. use of 
a particular approach to safety cases). 
Such theories are necessary and valuable, but it is also important to establish 
process theories for safety cases — theories that explain how safety cases affect 
behaviour and outcomes (Van de Ven 2007). In a simple domain, where convincing 
experiments are easy to carry out, we maybe would not need process theories; we 
would just do large numbers of experiments to evaluate and tune our variance 
theories. But in the extremely complex sociotechnical domain that we are concerned 
with, we desperately need process theories so we can identify those few empirical 
studies that are practical and that will shed some light on what is happening. 
We can use the work of Reinhart et al. and Graydon, but we need to do so in the 
context of building and evaluating process theories i.e. understanding the “how” 
claims. We need to model what a factor or property of interest does for safety and 
how it does it — we need to model the mechanism of its effect on safety. We need 
to turn the isolated claims into testable theories or, at least, into theories that imply 
a range of testable hypotheses. 
4.2 We need to compare multiple rival theories 
A straightforward way to make testable hypotheses is to define one theory we 
believe is important and set up studies to test it. In each study, we ask “are these 
results consistent with my theory, or are they just noise?” This is something like the 
default method in the natural sciences, and in much of social science too. 
A null-hypothesis approach is unrealistic, however, for our concerns here — we 
know beyond reasonable doubt that adopting a safety case approach does something 
to an engineering process. If nothing else, it costs money — money which is likely 
to be taken away from some other safety activity. And given that many practitioners 
are often positive about them (see e.g. (Reinhart 2017)) we know that in the very 
worst case the act of producing safety cases gives engineers the impression that they 
are valuable; that the use of safety cases influences engineer perception of what 
good safety practice is. 
In other words, it is unlikely that something as complex and far-reaching as 
safety case work does nothing at all in an engineering or operations process, unless 
the work is so siloed and isolated that the real development or operational personnel 
cannot even see it. At the very least, taking the most pessimistic position, safety 
cases will do nothing that is beneficial and some things that are not. They are 
extremely unlikely to do nothing at all. 
We therefore need to define several rival process theories, and conduct studies 
to figure out which of them are the best, i.e. are most consistent with the 
observations we are able to make. For more on how to do that, see (Ralph 2019, 
Van de Ven 2007, and Yin 2009). Some of our theories could, and should, be quite 
negative about safety cases. For a given study, two rivals may well be enough; for 
a wider programme, more will be needed. 
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4.3 We need to be selective about the theories we define and 
investigate 
We have assumed so far that we will build up our theories from the literature and 
from our own ideas. However there is a risk there that our prior assumptions may 
lead us into theories that are divorced from reality. So we should supplement our 
theory building with bottom-up descriptive work (Rae 2020). We need to prioritise 
what theories we develop and study. That is, we need to establish the assurance 
needs that potentially could be met by safety cases. 
It is not hard for us to come up with theories, especially partial or fragmentary 
ones. Fleshing them out thoroughly and conducting basic stress testing (e.g. manual 
review by peers) is important but also expensive. Running studies to compare their 
explanatory power is extremely expensive. We can prioritise by a variety of criteria 
which include: 
– Face plausibility 
– Prominence in the literature, in interviews, or in other evidence of what people 
are believing 
– Relevance to practice 
– The degree to which they are embodied in existing safety standards and 
guidelines 
If we want to change practitioners’ behaviour based on empirical studies, we 
have to perform empirical studies directly about the beliefs that at least some of 
them hold. Otherwise, we are asking them to do too much work to figure out how 
research results might apply to them, and whether the research has any implications 
for their behaviour. After all, many practitioners are already predisposed to ignore 
academic research (Devanbu 2016). 
Beyond that, if we can work out what theories are most “load-bearing” for 
stakeholders, i.e. which theories seem to most support the acceptance of safety cases 
as a practice, we can optimise our research to evaluate those. We should select rival 
theories in a similar way, in that we also evaluate those rivals that would 
significantly undermine trust in safety cases if people came to believe in them. 
4.4 Safety engineering theories need to be explicit about the 
effect of context 
As we have already emphasised, the starting point for a systematic evaluation 
process is to establish the safety assurance need or problems. Observational studies 
are useful instruments for identifying credible problems that safety cases have the 
potential to address and importantly for characterising the contexts within which 
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these problems occur, e.g. stakeholders, conventions and technical, social and 
financial constraints. 
Observational studies are particularly relevant here for understanding contextual 
factors, as safety cases are complex interventions in that there is no concrete 
boundary between the safety case process and other safety activities and the wider 
technical and sociotechnical processes. This is often illustrated by the different 
interpretations of what a safety case is, how it is used and by whom (Graydon 2017, 
Rae 2020). For instance, are hazard-driven simulations part of the safety case or an 
input to the safety case?  
Observational studies should also help appraise the nature, criticality and scale 
of the problem. For example, the fact that many safety case practices are manual or 
qualitative is often presented by researchers as a weakness. Observational studies 
could reveal, however, the extent to which safety cases work by stimulating 
engineers to understand their system better — something that might not have 
happen if the process had been automated. 
Safety concerns are very context-sensitive, so it is not enough to just study 
variation in terms of the safety case technique used. For example, take the following 
form of hypothesis (Graydon 2020): 
 
“form of argument” produces more/better “kind of value” for “actor” than 
“alternative” 
 
That omits some key experimental variables — the type of system being 
developed and the context in which that is being done. We cannot control these 
variables — deploying one form of safety assurance is already an expensive 
exercise, so duplicating such effort is unlikely to be approved by senior 
management. 
It follows that before we can study a safety intervention, we need to make a 
detailed description of that context. The key experimental variables lie in the system 
and the environment rather than just in the safety case solution, i.e. “form of 
argument”. Proposing to control these variables can be neither feasible nor 
desirable. Deploying one form of safety assurance is already an expensive exercise. 
Duplicating such effort is unlikely to be approved by senior management. More 
importantly, in a complex intervention, we are interested in understanding how the 
proposed solution influences and is influenced by its dynamic environment. 
Constraining the environment is likely to invalidate the credibility of the results and 
could lead to the loss of valuable insights into the different contextual factors, e.g. 
impact of system and environmental complexity on the significance and efficacy of 
different safety argument formats. 
A corollary of this is that when someone proposes a new safety case method, 
there is a lot that they can (and perhaps should) do to make it practical to evaluate 
it. They can support evaluation by defining an explicit, detailed theory of how it 
works, explaining exactly how the method produces outputs that meet the safety 
assurance need. If they do provide this hypothesised causal chain, then researchers 
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can evaluate it; if they don’t, researchers will have to do considerable prior work to 
understand why this new method might work. 
4.5 A good result from a research study is a modification to a 
process theory or a change in our belief levels with respect to two 
rival theories 
The result of a research study of the form discussed above should be some 
combination of: 
– A change to our relative levels of confidence as to which of the candidate 
theories is the best representation of what’s going on 
– A modification of a theory 
• E.g. by adding an applicability condition to the whole thing (e.g. “only 
when safety case developers perceived that a regulator was going to 
rigorously review their safety case”) 
• E.g. by striking out a connection (e.g. “despite searching hard across 
multiple organisations, we have found no evidence that incidents or 
accidents ever modify the high-level architecture of a case”) 
• E.g. by adding moderator to connection (e.g. “it appears that contradictions 
and ambiguities found by safety case developers can lead to changes in 
design engineer’s view of how safe the system is, but this is very much 
moderated by the perceived competence and status of the safety case 
developers“) 
By necessity, we must progress by means of individual studies, but it is the 
research programme, not an individual study, by which substantial advances in 
knowledge can happen. Individual studies tend to be small in scope, and are 
invariably vulnerable to error. A research programme built around a process theory, 
or a set of rival process theories, can be cumulative over the time in that it 
accumulates the insight of many different studies. 
There is never likely to be a stopping rule here for the overall research 
programme. We are always going to be in a space of “should we study safety case 
efficacy more? if so, what specifically should we study?”. 
5 An Example Theory 
Let us look at an example model, the McDermid Square (MoD, 2007), that theorises 
the necessary level of detail and rigour in safety cases against the novelty of the 
problem and solution. As depicted in Figure 1, the more novel the solution and the 
 Safety Cases: An Impending Crisis? 11 
problem are, the more extensive the argument and evidence need to be, including 
greater independence. 
 
 
Fig.1. McDermid Square: effect of problem and solution unfamiliarity on argument and 
evidence requirements (MoD, 2007) 
Let us take this example further and use the McDermid Square as the basis for 
an evaluation of the level of rigor in safety cases for a specific industrial context. 
The evaluation is scoped in the form of a logic model (Figure 2)1. 
The specific logic model we define in Figure 2 focuses on an airborne software 
scenario. The goal is to justify that a software system performs its intended function 
with a level of confidence in safety. 
The three forms of safety assurance approaches that we consider here are: 
a) A software safety case with an explicit and structured argument, 
represented in GSN, that is managed in the commercially-supported 
software tool ASCE2  
b) A tabular and detailed hazard log showing that all risks are low/tolerable 
c) DO178C software lifecycle data, including Software Accomplishment 
Summary, in a free text format. 
 
1 A logic model is a research instrument that is used in social sciences for defining the causal links 
between the elements and activities of a complex intervention, including the hypothesised intermediate 
and long-term outcomes. Importantly, a logic model is used to explicitly define the contextual factors 
that are likely to influence the hypothesised outcomes. 
2 ASCE Software: https://www.adelard.com/asce/choosing-asce/index/ 
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We can note that in (b) and (a), the safety argument is implicit. They are thus 
not safety case techniques per se, but they are rival safety techniques which may 
lead to the same outcomes. They are thus credible candidates for comparison. 
The intermediate outcomes that we specify are improvements in the 
understanding and control of how software failure conditions contribute to system 
hazards. These outcomes could be gauged via surveys, interviews and observational 
studies. The hypothesised long-term outcomes take the form of reduction in 
software-induced safety events, over a period of 5 years of operation. This could be 
established by reviewing software safety reports issued over that period. 
The software system here is a key variable. We can illustrate by considering two 
scenarios: 
1. A rule-based aircraft wheel braking software system, developed in 
MISRA C3, in a human piloted commercial aircraft 
2. An autonomous taxiing software system in an unmanned aircraft. 
For each scenario it is essential to detail the key contextual factors, such as the 
ones we list in Figure 2, and hypothesise their influence on the outputs and 
outcomes. Two plausible hypotheses would be: 
1. Increased rigor and clarity in the argument representation for the aircraft 
wheel braking software has very little effect on the stated outcomes. 
but conversely 
2. Increased rigor and clarity in the argument representation for the 
autonomous taxiing system ultimately reduces the level of the software-
induced safety events 
Hypothesis (2) could also be further qualified by stating that too much rigor in 
the representation of the argument, e.g. through formal mathematical notations and 
automation, is counterproductive in that such rigor complicates the communication 
between the different stakeholders and masks the sources of uncertainty that are 
hard to formalise. This could be analysed when gauging the intermediate outcomes. 
We realise that systematically and rigorously conducting the above study would 
be expensive. It is unclear whether a case could be made for similar evaluation 
studies to be funded by industry. What is clear however is that such studies are 
infeasible to conduct without the direct engagement of practising engineers, users 
and regulators and without access to the real development and operational settings 
(while of course maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive information). What is 
feasible, but unfortunately underutilised, is case study research — in the model 
describe by (Yin 2009) — in which one safety case approach could be evaluated in 
its natural industrial context. Experimental, hypothesis-driven studies are preferred 
 
3 https://www.misra.org.uk/Publications/tabid/57/Default.aspx 
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but case studies, particularly those utilising observational designs, are more 
practical and in some cases offer more insights into the complex contextual factors. 
6 Conclusions 
Empirical evidence for the value of safety cases is weak. This does not mean we 
should assume they don’t have value, but it does mean that improvements identified 
and proposed by the research and wider engineering community are not adopted in 
practice by organisations. This will mean ineffective use of safety cases and missed 
opportunities for safety improvements. Conversely, if developments in safety cases 
are adopted by industry without empirical evidence of effectiveness, this has the 
potential to not just fail to improve industrial practice, but in the worst case to make 
it worse. 
What is needed is a way to theorise well about how safety cases are effective, 
and a way to compare them to rival approaches. There are several credible theories 
and it looks like they can be usefully described. With the research approach we have 
discussed here, we think that it is possible and practicable to design and conduct 
studies that are likely to shed some light on key issues and reveal important 
distinctions. 
Beyond safety cases, the research methods outlined here may be applicable to 
many topics in the safety domain. Those topics all involve questions about social 
behaviour in organisations that is long term and hard to observe, and are all 
concerned with outcomes that are extremely rare. 
In short, our final messages are as follows: 
– Progress can only be credibly made through close collaboration between safety 
engineers who can identify the assurance needs and provide access to credible 
industrial settings, and researchers who can design and help execute empirical 
research studies. 
– Experimental, hypothesis-driven studies are preferable but case studies, 
particularly observational ones, are more likely to be practicable. 
– In order to have a genuinely cumulative research programme in safety cases, 
we need to develop and revise explicit process theories for how safety cases 
work. Having such theories makes research (a) practical, in that they allow you 
to identify those intermediate-result studies that can be done and (b) 
cumulative, in that experimental results can contribute to changing the theory, 
thus making the prevailing theor(ies) a record of our best current understanding 
of safety cases and their effects. 
– Researchers wishing to develop new approaches to safety cases, e.g. new 
notations, formalisms and tools, should explain and justify the safety assurance 
 
need, the process theory they are assuming, and the evaluation methods. If they 
use a case study, they should explain whether it is conducted in its natural 
industrial context or merely used for illustrative purposes. The latter has 
explanatory value, but no external validity. 
– When practising engineers report their experiences with safety case 
approaches, they should clarify whether these experiences correspond to their 
personal engineering judgments and opinions or the results of empirical 
research conducted in the relevant and clearly defined industrial settings (i.e. 
they should distinguish between opinion-based and evidence-based practice 
(Hampton 2002)). 
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